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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950521-CA 
v. : 
Priority No. 2 
BRYAN O. RASMUSSEN, : 
Oral Argument Not Requested 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Bryan O. Rasmussen appeals the enhanced penalties imposed 
upon his convictions for three counts of burglary, a third degree felony, and two counts 
of theft, also third degree felonies. The underlying convictions, plus the enhancements, 
for "acting in concert with two or more persons," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
(1995), were entered upon guilty pleas in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995), which enhances penalties for 
crimes committed in concert with two or more other persons, a legitimate sentencing 
statute, which does not require full trial-type procedures in order to apply? 
2. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) comply with Utah's constitutional 
"uniform operation of laws" provision? (b) comply with state "due process" 
principles? (c) comply with federal "equal protection of law" principles? 
3. Does section 76-3-203.1: (a) give adequate notice of the conditions 
that trigger its application? (b) honor First Amendment "association" rights? 
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine de novo whether the 
foregoing issues were properly preserved for appeal by presentation to die trial court, 
and if not preserved, whetfier some exception to the rule of waiver by default applies. 
See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). The preserved issues, questioning die 
constitutionality of a statute, are reviewed on appeal witiiout deference to die trial 
court. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1989). However, great 
deference is due to the legislature; doubts about the constitutionality of a statute are 
resolved in favor of statutory validity. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The challenged sentence enhancement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (1995), is copied in appendix I of this brief. The various constitutional 
provisions and statutes invoked by Rasmussen are copied in his Brief of Appellant, at 1-
6. They will be referenced as necessary in the text of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Rasmussen and two codefendants were charged with four counts of 
burglary and four counts of theft, third and second degree felonies, respectively (R. 7-
11). In the criminal information setting forth those charges, the State served notice of 
intention to request sentence enhancements, as provided under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (1995), because several of the charged offenses were "committed in concert with 
two or more persons" (R. 8-9). Enhancements for "in concert" crimes under section 
76-3-203.1 are commonly called "gang enhancements," although the statute contains no 
reference to "gangs." 
Rasmussen waived preliminary hearing and was bound over to district 
court (R. 3). There, he moved to strike the "in concert" enhancement, alleging four 
constitutional defects in section 76-3-203.1: (1) that the statute inadequately channels 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion; (2) that the statute fails to rationally advance its 
purpose; (3) that it "impinges on various rights unique to criminal defendants"; and (4) 
that the statute is vague (R. 22). Upon review of the parties' memoranda, the trial 
court denied Rasmussen's motion to strike the "in concert" enhancement (R. 40, 53-54, 
80-86). The court then accepted Rasmussen's guilty pleas to three of the burglary and 
two of the theft charges (R. 40). With the State's and the trial court's consent, 
Rasmussen reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the "in concert" 
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enhancement statute on appeal (R. 42). See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988); Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i).1 
A presentence evaluation and a sentencing hearing followed (R. 103-12). 
The trial court sentenced Rasmussen to concurrent zero-to-five year sentences on the 
three burglaries, but with the third of those counts enhanced, under the "in concert" 
statute, to three to five years; enhanced concurrent, three-to-five year sentences were 
also imposed for the two theft charges, those sentences to run consecutively to the 
burglary sentences (R. 60-67, 109-10).2 Thus the net effect was that Rasmussen was 
sentenced to two consecutive enhanced sentences of three to five years on his guilty 
pleas. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The burglaries and thefts were committed at several Salt Lake City 
businesses in autumn of 1994 (R. 7-10). The crimes appear to have been systematically 
planned, for some of the stolen property was cached in a storage unit rented to one of 
Rasmussen's codefendants (Hofftnan) under a false name (R. 12). Another codefendant 
1One of Rasmussen's codefendants, Christopher Cheeney, is similarly challenging the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 on appeal. State v. Cheeney, No. 950720-CA 
(Br. of Appellant filed 16 February 1996; Br. of Appellee filed 02 April 1996). 
Effective 01 May 1995, the value of property stolen was raised from $1000.00 to 
$5000.00 in order for theft to be a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1995). The parties agreed that Rasmussen stole property valued between $1000.00 and 
$5000.00, and therefore agreed, at sentencing, to reduce the theft offense levels from second 
to third degree felonies (R. 57). 
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(Cheeney) confessed his involvement in the thefts and burglaries, naming Rasmussen 
and another (Hoffman) as co-perpetrators (R. 12). When he pleaded guilty, Rasmussen 
admitted that he acted "as a party to" the offenses (R. 43-45, 94-96), thereby admitting 
the factual predicate for the section 76-3-203.1 "in concert" sentence enhancement. On 
appeal, Rasmussen pursues his challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The "in concert" enhancement does not create a new substantive 
offense. When compared with a similar sentence enhancement statute that was upheld 
against a similar "due process" challenge by the United States Supreme Court, section 
76-3.203.1 also passes constitutional muster. Portions of Rasmussen's arguments to the 
contrary, including his bid for distinctive state constitutional analysis, are not properly 
before this Court, because he did not present them to the trial court. The statute is a 
valid sentence enhancer that does not require trial-type proceedings to apply. 
2. Section 76-3-203.1 also satisfies state due process review. The statute 
enhances penalties for crimes committed in concert with two or more others. Because 
group crimes are more harmful than solo crimes, the statute rationally serves the 
legitimate purpose to more severely punish more harmful crimes, satisfying state due 
process as defined by the Utah Supreme Court. Rasmussen's due process "vagueness" 
allegation fails because it is based upon an inappropriate attempt to graft legislative 
debates about "gang" crime into the statute, which is unambiguous on its face. 
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Rasmussen's federal "equal protection" and state "uniform operation of laws" 
arguments are not preserved for appellate review. 
3. The "in concert" enhancement is not vague. The statute clearly 
defines "in concert" criminal conduct, which does not require proof that the defendant 
had a mens rea beyond that required for the predicate offense(s). The statute guides 
judicial discretion in its application, creating a permissible, rebuttable presumption that 
once the "in concert" facts are found, the enhancement will apply. Finally, the statute 
does not violate the First Amendment, because it only applies if both the defendant and 
the co-perpetrators are guilty of criminal conduct; therefore, the statute cannot infringe 
upon any constitutionally protected "associational" conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
Overview: Parameters of Review for 
Rasmussen ys Constitutional Challenges 
Rasmussen raises numerous constitutional challenges to Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-203.1 (1995), the "in concert" enhancement statute under which he was 
sentenced. Several basic principles govern the analysis on appeal. 
First, arguments not made in the trial courts, even constitutionally based 
ones, are waived on appeal absent a showing of "plain error" or "exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991). Similarly, arguments that Utah 
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courts should depart from federal interpretations in analyzing claims under analogous 
state constitutional provisions are also waived if such arguments were not articulated in 
the trial court. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus 
granted on other grounds, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911 
(1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). In this case, 
Rasmussen has failed to preserve some of his constitutional challenges. Additionally, 
Rasmussen's trial court memorandum supporting his motion to strike the "in concert" 
statute (R. 22-28, copied in appendix II of this brief), articulated no reason to interpret 
Utah constitutional provisions differently from their federal analogues. 
Next, statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will not 
be stricken unless proven invalid beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 
390, 397-98 (Utah 1989); State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). That 
proof burden is even heavier when a statute is attacked as facially unconstitutional, 
rather than unconstitutional as applied in the case at bar. A facial challenge requires 
proof that no circumstances can exist in which the statute could validly apply. See 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). It therefore follows that if a 
challenger cannot show that a statute was unconstitutionally applied in the case at bar, a 
facial challenge cannot succeed. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). In this case, Rasmussen argues broadly that 
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the "in concert" enhancement is unconstitutional, indicating facial challenges. He fails 
to prove either facial or aas applied" defects. 
POINT ONE 
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS A 
LEGITIMATE SENTENCE ENHANCER THAT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE FULL TRIAL PROCEDURES TO APPLY 
In his first challenge to the "in concert" enhancement statute, Rasmussen 
argues that section 76-3-203.1 creates a new crime. Therefore, his reasoning goes, in 
order for the statute to apply, the "in concert" element must be decided at a trial at 
which full constitutional protections-jury trial, witness confrontation, proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, and so on-are followed (Br. of Appellant at 11-23). Rasmussen's 
argument is based upon federal and state "due process." Because his trial court 
memorandum did not advocate differing analyses under these analogous provisions, the 
federal analysis applies. 
The relevant federal case is McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 
(1986). In McMillan, the United States Supreme Court rejected a due process-based 
challenge to Pennsylvania's "firearm enhancement" statute, which provides enhanced 
penalties for certain predicate crimes when the sentencing judge, unaided by a jury, 
finds that the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" while committing the crime. The 
Court also held that visible firearm possession under the enhancement statute only 
requires proof by the "preponderance of evidence" standard. 477 U.S. at 91-92. The 
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Utah Supreme Court has approvingly cited McMillan in a case upholding another type 
of sentence enhancement statute. See State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1989) 
(approving enhancement for dealing drugs within 1000 feet of a public school). Utah's 
"in concert" statute similarly enhances the sentence for certain crimes committed "in 
concert with" two or more other persons, as found by the trial court after the defendant 
is found guilty of the predicate crime(s). Under McMillan, this Court should reject 
Rasmussen's argument that section 76-3-203.1 creates a new substantive offense, which 
must be proven by full trial-type procedures and proof burdens. 
A, Section 76-3-203.1 Closely Resembles the "Firearm Enhancement" 
Statute that Was Upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Utah Legislature has expressly declared that the "in concert" 
enhancement "does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced penalty 
for the primary offense." Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203. l(5)(a) (1995). In McMillan, All 
U.S. at 84-86, a similar disclaimer in the Pennsylvania firearm enhancement statute 
was upheld under due process review. For reasons similar to those underpinning the 
McMillan holding, this Court should honor the disclaimer in section 76-3-203.1. 
Upholding the firearm enhancement in McMillan, the United States 
Supreme Court took note of several features that made Pennsylvania's statute a 
legitimate sentence enhancer, rather than a statute that defined a new offense. Utah's 
"in concert" statute shares those same features. Like the Pennsylvania statute in 
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McMillan, All U.S. at 87, Utah's section 76-3-203.1 only applies once the defendant is 
found guilty of an enumerated predicate offense in subsection (4). Like Pennsylvania's 
statute, 477 U.S. at 87, section 76-3-203.1 creates no defendant-adverse factual 
presumptions; instead, the prosecution must first establish guilt of the predicate crime, 
and then prove the "in concert" factor. Like Pennsylvania's statute, 477 U.S. at 87-88, 
Utah's statute only raises the minimum punishment for the predicate offenses, as set 
forth in subsection (3); it does not raise the maximum punishment above the normally 
prescribed ranges.3 
Finally, just as Pennsylvania's statute requires consideration of firearm 
possession as a traditional crime "instrumentality" factor at sentencing, 477 U.S. at 89, 
so too does section 76-3-203.1 merely require consideration of one of the many 
"circumstances of the crime" that traditionally are considered in criminal sentencing. 
A crime committed in concert with others constitutes a more serious circumstance, 
warranting greater punishment than a solo crime. The logic of this is straightforward: 
group crimes cause more harm and distress than solo crimes. The harm caused by any 
crime is a legitimate sentencing factor. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 113 S. 
Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993). In this case, it can readily be inferred that, aided by his co-
perpetrators, Rasmussen was able to steal more property more quickly than he could 
^Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995) (Utah's "dangerous weapon" 
enhancement, which adds consecutive penalty to predicate crime penalty, requires finding by 
"the trier of fact"). 
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have acting alone. Therefore, just as the federal Supreme Court upheld the 
enhancement statute in McMillan, so too should this Court uphold Utah's section 76-3-
203.1 as a valid sentencing statute. 
B. Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Permit "Perfunctory" Decisions on 
"Complicated" Matters. 
The firearm enhancement in McMillan involved a "simple, 
straightforward issue susceptible of objective proof." 477 U.S. at 84. Rasmussen 
argues that Utah's "in concert" finding "involves complicated determinations of the 
intent of other individuals . . . (Br. of Appellant at 14). Therefore, he argues, the "in 
concert" finding requires full trial-type proceedings. If left to the sentencing court, 
Rasmussen suggests, the "in concert" finding will only be made in "perfunctory" 
fashion (id.). This argument fails, under both "as applied" and "facial" analysis. 
Rasmussen cannot show that section 76-3-203.1 was unconstitutionally 
applied in this case, because when pleading guilty, and later during sentencing, he 
conceded that the "in concert" finding was satisfied (R. 93-96 (admitting that he acted 
"as a party to" the offenses); R. 105 (agreeing that enhancement applies)). "[B]efore a 
party can challenge the constitutionality of a statute, he must be adversely affected by 
its operation." State v. Mohiy 901 P.2d 991, 1005 (Utah 1995). Because Rasmussen 
never submitted the "in concert" issue and the intent of his co-perpetrators to any 
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adversarial testing, he cannot complain that the issue would have been perfunctorily 
decided, or too complicated for the trial court to decide, in his case. 
Because Rasmussen cannot prove an "as applied" constitutional defect in 
section 76-3-203.1, he also cannot prove that the statute is facially invalid. Nor could 
he prove a facial defect in any event. True, proof of the "in concert" facts is not as 
simple as proof that a firearm was used to commit an offense. However, Rasmussen 
cites no authority to support his apparent premise that "complicated" issues can only be 
decided by full trial-type proceedings. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (rejecting argument that was unsupported by analysis or authority). In 
fact, trial judges often decide complicated issues: admission of evidence under hearsay 
and confrontation rules, balancing relevance against unfair prejudice, and Fourth 
Amendment exclusion decisions are just a few examples. With respect to sentencing, 
federal trial judges apply the highly complex federal sentencing guidelines, again 
without full trial-type procedures; those guidelines and procedures for their application 
have been upheld against constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. 
Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993). 
Bearing this in mind, Utah's "in concert" statute does not strain the 
capabilities of state sentencing judges. The statute only requires that after a guilt 
determination on the predicate offense(s), it be shown that the defendant acted with 
others who would also be criminally liable for the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
12 
203. l(l)(b) (1995). The mens rea for such co-perpetrators need not match that of the 
defendant at bar; only some minimally criminal mental state need be proven. State v. 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994). Just as they often decide complicated 
factual and evidentiary issues, trial judges often decide issues of mental state without 
full trial-type procedures. See, e.g., State v. Carter 888 P.2d 629, 641 (Utah) 
(voluntariness of confession), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995); State 
v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah App. 1991) (voluntariness of search consent), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(10) & -(11) 
(1995) (competency to proceed to trial). Clearly, the "in concert" finding is not too 
"complicated" to be decided by sentencing judges. 
Rasmussen's claim that the "in conceit" enhancement statute permits 
"perfunctory" decisions also lacks merit. On their face, subsections 76-3-203.l(l)(b) 
and -(5)(c) specifically direct the sentencing judge to find that the co-perpetrators would 
be criminally liable as parties to the predicate offense committed by the defendant at 
bar, and to reduce that finding to writing. If the judge opts to suspend the 
enhancement, he or she must, under subsection (6), state the reasons therefor in 
writing. Thus the statute facially requires careful, articulated factfinding and 
reasoning; "perfunctory" application is not permitted. 
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C. Section 76-3-203.1 Legitimately Contains No "Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt" Requirement. 
This Court should also reject Rasmussen's argument that "the risk of 
erroneous fact-finding" requires that the facts necessary for the "in concert" 
enhancement be proven beyond reasonable doubt (Br. of Appellant at 15). Once more, 
because Rasmussen acquiesced in the "in concert" finding, the trial court was never 
required to decide the level of proof. Therefore, no "as applied" error can be found. 
Also, as a facial matter, the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
same argument in McMillan, observing that once found guilty of an offense, a criminal 
defendant "has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State 
may confine him." 477 U.S. at 92 & n.8 (quoting authority). See also State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (upon adjudication of guilt, "[t]he 
defendant's right to liberty is not in issue because he will be confined . . . " ) . 
"Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any 
prescribed burden of proof at all." McMillan, 411 U.S. at 91 (citing authority). 
Therefore, a decision about the precise sentence within the statutorily-prescribed range 
only requires a "preponderance of evidence" standard. Id. 
The predicate offenses to which Rasmussen pleaded guilty authorized the 
State to incarcerate him from zero to five years. Rasmussen had no legal expectation of 
a sentence in the low end of that range. See State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah 
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1981). The "in concert" enhancement merely raised his minimum sentence within that 
range. It would have been proper, therefore, to equally allocate the risk of an 
erroneous "in concert" finding between Rasmussen and the State, by using the 
"preponderance" proof standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-29 
(1979) (degrees of proof allocate risk of error between the parties) {cited in McMillan, 
All U.S. at 92 n.8). Therefore, Utah's "in concert" enhancement does not require the 
"beyond reasonable doubt" proof standard, which only rarely, if ever, applies outside 
of substantive guilt determinations. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428; cf. Osborn v. 
Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610, 619 (D. Wyo. 1986) (capital penalty phase does not 
require proof beyond reasonable doubt), aff'd, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988). 
D. Section 76-3-203.1 Does Not Give Rise to an Impermissible "Tail 
Wagging the Dog" Situation. 
In McMillan, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are due process 
limits, albeit not easily defined, to a State's ability to designate certain criminal 
proceedings as "sentencing" rather than as definitions of substantive crimes. 477 U.S. 
at 86, 91. Borrowing a metaphor from McMillan, id. at 88, Rasmussen argues that 
Utah's "in concert" enhancement transgresses those limits, and is "the tail that wags 
the dog" of the predicate offense (Br. of Appellant at 15). This happens, he explains, 
because the enhancement requires findings that at least two others were parties to the 
predicate offense committed by the defendant at bar. Therefore, he concludes, a[t]wo 
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thirds of the required facts" are impermissibly taken from a jury, and delegated to the 
sentencing judge (Br. of Appellant at 15). 
Once more, Rasmussen is ill-positioned to claim that Utah's "in concert" 
enhancement was unconstitutionally applied to him in the foregoing manner. In the 
trial court, he never demanded a factfinding procedure of any nature, by jury or 
otherwise, for his own guilt or that of his co-perpetrators. Instead, by pleading guilty 
and then stipulating to application of the "in concert" enhancement, Rasmussen 
conceded the existence of all the necessary facts-both for his own guilt and that of his 
co-perpetrators. Therefore, it is not necessary to speculate whether on its face, the 
statute's factfinding procedures are insufficiently strict. 
Such facial argument would fail. While Rasmussen makes creative use of 
the "tail wagging" metaphor, he does not support his argument with authority. Settled 
practice rejects Rasmussen's apparent underlying belief that the question whether a 
factual issue must be decided by a judge or by a jury depends upon a simple tally of 
how many discrete facts must be decided. Sentencing courts traditionally consider 
numerous facts besides those constituting the predicate offense. See Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). Consistent with this tradition of broad sentencing 
inquiry, Utah's presentence reports compile facts about damages caused by a crime, 
plus the defendant's social, educational, and work history, and so forth, to help decide 
the sentence. The facts thus compiled can far outnumber the facts constituting the 
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crime for which sentence is to be pronounced, yet no court has suggested that such 
facts must be decided by full trial-type proceedings (at least not in noncapital cases). 
Rasmussen's argument also breaks down when applied only to the facts 
constituting the defendant's and the co-perpetrators' criminal liability under Utah's "in 
concert" enhancement. By implication of his argument, the tail would not wag the dog 
if most of the required facts were decided by full trial-type proceedings. Therefore, so 
long as the defendant at bar and only one co-perpetrator were found guilty by such 
proceedings, it would be permissible to find another co-perpetrator's liability at 
sentencing proceedings.4 There is no rational justification for such a rule. 
E. Rasmussen's Independent State Constitutional Argument Is Not 
Preserved for Appellate Consideration. 
Rasmussen finally argues that even if section 76-3-203.1 satisfies federal 
due process standards as a sentencing provision, this Court should declare that under 
the Utah Constitution, the "in concert" enhancement is really a new substantive offense 
(Br. of Appellant at 16-23). This argument should be summarily rejected, because 
Rasmussen never argued for diverging state and federal constitutional analyses on this 
point in the trial court. Instead, he merely cited various Utah constitutional provisions 
in his trial court memorandum attacking the enhancement statute (R. 22-28 (appendix II 
4In effect, this happened in this case. Rasmussen's codefendant and co-perpetrator, 
Cheeney, pleaded guilty to theft and burglary involving the same incidents. Therefore, two 
thirds of the required facts were established by proceedings prior to sentencing, and the tail 
does not wag the dog in this case. 
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of this brief)). It is settled that such nominal allusion to state constitutional provisions 
fails to satisfy the trial-level preservation requirement. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 830 
P.2d 310, 312 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
Briefly, Rasmussen's argument for more defendant-favorable treatment 
under the Utah Constitution would be properly denied on its merits. His contention 
that federal law on this point is "unworkable" (Br. of Appellant at 16-18), based on 
assertedly contradictory results in Mullaney v. Wilbur, All U.S. 684 (1975), and 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), does not aid him in attacking the penalty 
enhancement question presented in this case. Mullaney and Patterson involved 
challenges to proof burden allocation regarding the mens rea element of substantive 
offenses. See McMillan, All U.S. at 84-85 (explaining Mullaney and Patterson). Even 
assuming that those cases reached inconsistent results, they are distinguishable from the 
penalty enhancement situations in McMillan and in this case for the simple reason that 
the former cases clearly involved proof of substantive criminal guilt. In contrast, the 
penalty enhancement question does not arise until after guilt of a predicate crime has 
been established; it therefore does not invade any finding that, as a matter of 
fundamental tradition, McMillan, All U.S. at 85 (quoting authority), might be deemed 
the province of the trier of substantive guilt. Therefore, the asserted confusion caused 
by Mullaney and Patterson does not extend to the sentence enhancement situation in 
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this case, and does not justify a different result (which would clearly contradict express 
legislative intent) in the construction of section 76-3-203.1. 
Rasmussen's federal due process-based argument fails on its merits; his 
state constitutional argument is not preserved for appeal. Therefore, this Court should 
reject, in toto, Rasmussen's claim that section 76-3-203.1 defines an offense. The 
statute is a valid sentencing enhancement. As such, only the rudimentary due process 
required at sentencing hearings is required for the "in concert" enhancment to apply. 
See State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1978) ("the basic provisions afforded by 
our law to persons accused of crime do not exist in the same manner after he has been 
convicted"); State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) (sentencing under "minimum 
mandatory" statutes entails a relatively informal procedure). 
POINT TWO 
THE "IN CONCERT" SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT 
REASONABLY ADVANCES A LEGITIMATE 
PURPOSE, AND GIVES PROPER NOTICE OF ITS 
APPLICABILITY 
In his second point on appeal, Rasmussen argues that section 76-3-203.1 
violates state due process, state uniform operation of laws, and federal equal protection 
principles. See Utah Const. Art. I § 7, Art I § 24; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1. At 
no point in the trial court did Rasmussen articulate any argument under federal equal 
protection or state uniform operation of laws principles (see R. 22-28 (appendix II of 
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this brief)). Because he does not claim any exception to the rule of waiver by default, 
those arguments cannot now be considered on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 
1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 (Utah App. 1991).5 
Rasmussen did preserve his state due process argument in the trial court, 
by citing State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), a state due process decision, 
and by reciting the "rational advancement of legitimate purpose" state due process test 
set forth in it (R. 24 (appendix II of this brief)). Therefore, the State addresses the 
state due process portion of this point on the merits. 
A. The Enhancement Satisfies State Due Process "Rational Service of 
Legitimate Purpose." 
In Copeland, the Utah Supreme Court struck two statutory requirements 
for committing a "guilty but mentally ill" criminal defendant to a psychiatric hospital 
instead of prison. 765 P.2d at 1270-72. The stricken requirements had been imported 
from Utah's civil commitment statute. The court held that those requirements were 
"irrelevant" to the decision whether to imprison or hospitalize the offender, and 
therefore not "rationally related" to the interests served by the "guilty but mentally ill" 
commitment statute. Id. at 1271, 1272. The court pronounced those provisions 
5Rasmussen implicitly argues that he preserved all constitutional challenges to section 
76-3-203.1 by his motion to strike the enhancement statute (Br. of Appellant at 7). The 
problem is that by not alerting the trial court to some of the specific constitutional defects that 
he now alleges on appeal, Rasmussen deprived the trial court of the first opportunity to 
address those alleged defects. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
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"arbitrary and capricious." Id. at 1272.6 The state due process test for a statute's 
legitimacy, drawn from Copeland, is simply that the statute rationally relate to a 
legitimate purpose, or that it not be "arbitrary and capricious.* This is an easily 
satisfied standard, and properly so, given the strong presumption that statutes are 
constitutional. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). Utah's "in concert" 
statute satisfies this standard. As explained in Point One of this brief, group crimes 
cause more harm than solo crimes. Therefore, it is rational to more severely punish 
somebody who commits a crime with the assistance of two or more other criminals. 
Accordingly, section 76-3-203.1 satisfies Utah due process requirements. 
B. Section 76-3-203.1 Provides Traditional Due Process "Notice." 
Rasmussen's major complaint under this point is not that the "in concert" 
enhancement fails to rationally serve a legitimate purpose. He complains that the 
enhancement statute's language does not reveal its true purpose, and further, that the 
statute is often applied to situations not related to that purpose. Thus he is really 
6Ironically, the result in Copeland may have made the "guilty but mentally ill" 
commitment statute less firm under federal due process scrutiny. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480 (1980), the federal Supreme Court held that prisoners have a "liberty interest" against 
involuntary transfer to mental health facilities, contrary to the view expressed in Copeland, 
765 P.2d at 1271 ("the defendant's liberty is not in issue . . . " ) ; therefore, careful due process 
must be observed to prevent an improper transfer. The statutory provisions stricken in 
Copeland helped to protect against improper psychiatric commitment of a prisoner: one 
provision required proof that the defendant could not rationally decide whether he or she 
needed treatment; the other required proof that there was no appropriate treatment other than 
psychiatric hospitalization. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. 
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alleging a due process "notice" defect. See, e.g., Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (statutes must accurately describe prohibited conduct). 
The alleged defect arises from Rasmussen's contention that the "in 
concert" enhancement is actually intended to "target members of criminal street 
gangs"; however, in practice the Enhancement "is widely applied to non-gangmembers" 
(Br. of Appellant at 25, 27). Rasmussen's complaint is founded upon his recitation of 
legislative debates about the statute, which reveal a concern about criminal "gangs" 
(Br. of Appellant at 25-26 & addendum A). There is no record evidence that 
Rasmussen belongs to such a "gang." Therefore, his argument goes, Rasmussen was 
not on notice that the "in concert" enhancement would apply to him. 
Constitutional due process analysis is not necessary to resolve this claim. 
Instead, Rasmussen's complaint fails by operation of two basic rules of statutory 
construction. 
First, when a statute's text is unambiguous, the use of legislative history 
to interpret the statute is unnecessary and inappropriate. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 
P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994). The text of section 76-3-203.1 is unambiguous. 
Subsection (l)(a) plainly provides that a crime committed in concert with two or ijiore 
other persons is subject to the enhanced penalty. It contains no reference to "gangs," 
and makes no effort to criminalize or specially punish "gang" membership. Compare 
Cal. Penal Code §§ 186.20 through -.28 (West Supp. 1996) (Br. of Appellant 
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addendum B) (repeated reference to "street gangs," with apparent creation of 
freestanding substantive offense in subsection 186.22(a)). Utah's statute then defines 
"in concert" action, in subsection (l)(b); explains the process for applying the 
enhancement, in subsections (2), (5)(c), and (6); lists the precise enhancements, in 
subsection (3); and lists the specific offenses to which the enhancement applies, in 
subsection (4). All these subsections are likewise devoid of "gang" references. The 
legislature's concern about "gangs" (actually the concern of the quoted legislators), is 
therefore irrelevant for interpreting section 76-3-203.1. The statute plainly enhances 
penalties for crimes committed "in concert" with others, regardless whether "gang" 
affiliation is present. 
Second, statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional problems, 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). By asking this Court to engraft a "gang" 
prohibition into section 76-3-203.1, Rasmussen is attempting to create constitutional 
problems-not only of vagueness in the difficult task of defining "gangs," but also a 
possibility of threatening First Amendment "associational" rights. This Court should 
decline Rasmussen's invitation to create constitutional flaws in section 76-3-203.1. By 
its plain language, the statute enhances punishment for crimes committed in concert 
with two or more other persons. Nothing more (and nothing less) may be read into it. 
Thus properly interpreted, section 76-3-203.1 gives adequate notice of the kind of 
criminal conduct that is subject to an "in concert" penalty enhancement. 
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POINT THREE 
THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IS 
NOT VAGUE, AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
In his final point on appeal, Rasmussen contends that section 76-3-203.1 
"is void for vagueness under a federal due process analysis" (Br. of Appellant at 31). 
This last contention is partially founded upon some arguments by Rasmussen that have 
been previously discussed in this brief. Those arguments failed; so too do Rasmussen's 
final "vagueness" contentions fail. 
A. Section 76-3-203.1 Adequately Defines "In Concert.5' 
Rasmussen argues that section 76-3-203.1 fails to adequately define "in 
concert." Subsection (l)(b) of the statute defines "in concert" by reference to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995), Utah's "party liability" statute, and requires that the 
defendant's co-perpetrators act in a manner that would make them also criminally liable 
for the defendant's criminal conduct. As construed in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 
461 (Utah 1994), the interplay of these two statutes means that in order for the "in 
concert" enhancement to apply, the co-perpetrators need not act with the same level of 
criminal intent, or mens rea, as the defendant at bar; they need only act with some 
minimally criminal mens rea. 
Rasmussen argues, however, that in order for the "in concert" 
enhancement to apply, the defendant at bar must act with a mens rea beyond that 
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required for the predicate crime(s). He or she must also have, he asserts, the additional 
criminal intent to commit the crime "in concert" with the co-perpetrators. He argues 
that section 76-3-203.1 "should not subject an individual to harsher punishment based 
on the random acts of others." The statute is therefore unconstitutionally vague, he 
concludes, because it does not specify an additional "in concert" mens rea in order for 
the enhancement to apply (Br. of Appellant at 32). 
This argument fails because Rasmussen did not present it to the trial court 
(see R. 26-28, appendix II of this brief). Because Rasmussen alleges no exception to 
the rule of waiver by default, this argument cannot be entertained on appeal. See State 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). The argument also fails because 
Rasmussen does not show that the alleged error rendered section 76-3-203.1 
unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, he does not claim that his co-
perpetrators acted "randomly," i.e., without his knowledge. Such a claim would be a 
dubious one, given that the conduct included several burglaries and thefts, the conduct 
appeared cooperatively planned (a co-perpetrator rented a storage unit for the stolen 
goods), and one of the co-perpetrators confessed to the group's criminal activity (R. 7-
10, 12). 
Further, as a facial matter, Alvarez and State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989), counsel against Rasmussen's assertion that section 76-3-203.1 must 
contain a mens rea requirement beyond that required for the predicate crime(s). In 
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Moore, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a statute that enhanced the penalty for illegal 
drug dealing when committed within 1000 feet of a public school. The "within 1000 
feet" element was a strict liability provision, requiring no knowledge of a school's 
proximity. 782 P.2d at 504. Upholding the enhancement, the court found no due 
process bar: "Utah law does not require that the aggravating element be accompanied 
by a mens rea. Therefore, [the statute], which eliminates lack of knowledge about the 
aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced penalty, does not violate 
due process." Id. at 505. 
Subsequently, in Alvarez, the court implicitly rejected the proposition that 
in order for Utah's "in concert" enhancement to apply, the defendant's actions must be 
attended by a mens rea to act in concert with others. The main holding in Alvarez, as 
already explained, is that co-perpetrators need not act with an identical mens rea to the 
defendant at bar in order for the enhancement to apply. However, the court in Alvarez 
also observed that the defendant had been found guilty of the predicate offense, which 
required a "knowing and intentional" mens rea, 872 P.2d at 462, thereby implying that 
mens rea for the predicate offense is the only mens rea necessary in order for the "in 
concert" enhancement to apply. That implication is consistent with the court's earlier 
holding in Moore: so long as the predicate offense with its requisite mens rea is 
established, an additional "enhancer" or "aggravator" does not require proof of an 
additional mens rea element. Accordingly, even if Rasmussen's facial vagueness 
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challenge about mens rea were properly before this Court, it would fail: the term "in 
concert" does not require its own mens rea. 
B. Section 76-3-203.2 Adequately Guides Judicial Discretion. 
Rasmussen next makes the surprising assertion that section 76-3-203.1 
"utterly fails to constrain or guide" judicial discretion in its application (Br. of 
Appellant at 34). Once more, because Rasmussen conceded the statute's applicability 
in his case, he has no viable "as applied" challenge. And as a facial matter, reading 
the statute reasonably and as a whole, his claim is without merit. As already explained, 
subsection (l)(b) clearly defines "in concert," apprising both defendants and trial 
judges of what is involved. 
Next, subsection (5)(c) makes the enhancement contingent upon a written 
"in concert" finding. Notwithstanding such finding, subsection (6)(a) provides that the 
sentencing judge "may suspend" the enhancement "required under this section," 
provided that he or she state the reasons therefor (emphasis added). This language 
cabins the sentencing judge's discretion by creating a presumption that once the "in 
concert" condition is foxmd to exist, the enhancement will apply (it is "required"). The 
enhancement can be suspended only if the judge makes an articulated determination that 
the "interests of justice" support suspension. (Any vagueness in the term "interests of 
justice" aids the defendant, who may utilize it to introduce broad mitigating evidence.) 
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There is no constitutional problem with this rule. Utah courts have 
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to Utah's three-tiered minimum 
mandatory sentence scheme for certain offenses. Under that scheme, the middle of the 
three available punishments applies, unless the sentencing judge articulates reasons to 
impose the lowest or the highest minimum mandatory term. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201(6) (Supp. 1995); State v. LovelU 758 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1988) (discretion is 
granted under the three-tiered scheme); State v.Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987) 
(three-tiered scheme is not vague). The similarly limited judicial discretion to impose 
the "in concert" enhancement is therefore proper. 
C. The Statute Does Not Impair First Amendment Rights. 
Rasmussen finally makes the frivolous allegation that the "in concert" 
enhancement infringes upon First Amendment "associational" right-that is, "the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. The foregoing First Amendment text, by itself, 
defeats this claim. The amendment permits "peaceable" assembly, not assembly to 
commit crimes. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951). 
To the extent that Rasmussen really alleges "overbreadth"-* claim related 
to vagueness, see State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah App. 1991) (Br. of 
Appellant at 36)~his allegation also fails. A statute is overbroad if it proscribes, or 
appears to proscribe, a substantial amount of conduct that is protected by the First 
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Amendment. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984); State v. Murphy, 61A 
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983). Section 76-3-203.1 does not proscribe any protected 
conduct, because it cannot apply until the defendant is found guilty of a predicate 
criminal offense. Even then, the enhancement does not apply merely because the 
defendant associates with a particular group of persons. Cf. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 
U.S. 159 (1992) (membership in racist group, by itself, cannot be used to enhance 
penalty). Further, under subsection (l)(b), the enhancement only applies if the 
defendant acted with others who also "would be criminally liable as parties" to the 
predicate offense. In fact, by avoiding any effort to criminalize "gang" association/?^ 
se, the statute avoids any risk of outlawing protected associational conduct. Therefore, 
Rasmussen's First Amendment-based challenge, like his other attacks on the "in 
concert" enhancement statute, should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Rasmussen's enhanced sentences should be 
AFFIRMED. This Court should consider consolidating this appeal with State v. 
Cheeney, No. 950720-CA, now also pending, which involves a similar challenge to 
section 76-3-203.1 by one of Rasmussen's co-perpetrators. See Utah R. App. P. 3(b). 
A published opinion appears appropriate to dispel any doubt about the constitutionality 
of section 76-3-203.1. The State does not request oral argument. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
("In Concert" Sentence Enhancement) 
76-3-203.1 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons 
— Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert 
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense 
as provided below. 
(b) I n concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for 
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. 
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or 
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice 
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive 
offense charged. 
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subse-
quently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include 
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any 
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the 
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons, 
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially 
prejudiced by the omission. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are: 
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall 
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure 
correctional facility. 
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. 
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison. 
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be 
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison. 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed, 
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in 
prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, 
regarding drug-related offenses; 
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1; 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3; 
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter S, Part 4; 
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1; 
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, 
Chapter 6, Part 2; 
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3; 
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4; 
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(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 
76-6-503, 76-6-604, 76-6-505, 76^-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-
6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 
76-6-520; 
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title 
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 
76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in 
Section 76-8-509; 
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3; 
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5; 
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses 
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12; 
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13; 
(a) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety 
Act; 
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act; 
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and 
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an 
enhanced penalty for the primary offense. 
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section 
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert 
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those 
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. 
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to 
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the 
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this 
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter 
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section. 
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence 
required under this section if the court: 
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and 
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the 
record and in writing. 
History: C. 1968,764-308.1, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 807,1 1; 1994, ch. 18,1 108. 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1994 amend-
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findings of fact 
Menttl state of parties. 
Findings of fact. 
Even though tht trial court did not make 
written findings of fact concerning applicability 
inent, effective May 2,1994, corrected tha ref-
erence in Subaaction (lXaX 
of tha enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do 
under this section, failure of defendant to object 
to the enhanosment precluded consideration of 
tha iaaue on appeal State * Labrum, 246 Utah 
Adv. Rap. U (Utah Ct App. 1994X 
Mental state of parties. 
For thia aection to apply, a defendant must 
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The Utah gang enhancement statute imposes significantly 
increased minimum sentences for several specified offenses, in 
cases wherein the offenses are committed by at least three people 
acting as accomplices. Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1. A 
copy of the statute and the legislative history of the statute is 
attached to this memo. 
It is Mr. Rasmussen's position that the gang enhancement 
statute is unconstitutional in four main respects: the statute 
fails to adequately channel prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion; the statute fails to meet the legislative purpose in 
a rational manner; the statute impinges on various rights unique 
to criminal defendants; and the statute is too vague to forewarn 
citizens about the criminal consequences of their actions. 
rM T~ 
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Motion to Strike 
Gang Enhancement 
Statute 
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1- Vagueness - failure to channel prosecutorial and judicial 
discretion 
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws 
which are sufficiently definite to confine the discretion of law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges. Kolendar v. 
Lawson. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). Laws must be sufficiently narrow 
in scope that police officer, prosecutors and judges are not 
allowed to discriminate in their application. E.g. Constitution 
of Utah, Article I section 2, Article I section 24 (equal 
protection, uniform operation of laws provisions). Courts are 
especially careful to scrutinize legislation which might impinge 
on basic First Amendment freedoms such as freedom of speech, 
rights to assembly and rights to association. IcL See also 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 1 (defining similar but 
different rights under Utah Constitution). Under Utah 
Constitutional standards, it is extremely important for the 
legislature to narrow the scope of criminal statutes, so that 
laws do not delegate the legislative function to actors from 
other government branches. E.g. Constitution of Utah, Article V 
section 1 (separation of powers provision). 
The gang enhancement statute allows prosecutors exceedingly 
broad authority to charge the gang enhancement because the 
statute applies regardless of whether the parties other than the 
defendant are even identified, let alone prosecuted 
commensurately with the defendant. Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-
203.1(5)(b). 
The gang enhancement statute gives judges virtually unbridled 
discretion to decide which enhanceable offenses are actually 
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punished under the enhancement, by allowing the suspension of the 
gang enhancement if the judge finds that the interests of justice 
are served thereby, and states findings on the record to such 
effect. Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6). 
As is true of all vague laws, the vague provisions of the gang 
enhancement statute can be used improperly by government actors 
who might be consciously or subconsciously inclined to 
discriminate against certain classes of individuals, or to 
impinge upon citizens' rights to association, free speech, and 
other related rights. E.g. Grayned v. Citv of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
104, 108-109 (1972). Inasmuch as the courts are empowered to 
protect those most vulnerable to governmental discrimination and -
overreaching, see United States v. Carolene Products Company, 3 04 
U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), this Court should use its authority 
to strike the gang enhancement statute. 
2. Due process - lack of rational relationship between law and 
legislative goal 
Under Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, 
legislation must meet the legislative purpose in a rational 
manner. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) . A review 
of the legislative history of the gang enhancement statute 
demonstrates that the legislature intentionally enacted statutory 
language designed by its drafters to obfuscate the legislative 
intent, and that the legislature included the broad judicial 
discretion provision as the mechanism whereby the statute would 
hopefully apply as intended. 
The legislative purpose of the gang enhancement statute was to 
deter hard core California gang members from migrating to Utah to 
franchise crack cocaine. Legislative history, at 1-9. It is 
readily apparent to anyone reading the language of the statute 
that the actual applicability of the statute is far different 
from that intended by the legislature. Review of the legislative 
history explains the discrepancy and highlights the 
unconstitutionality of the provision. 
The drafters of the statute omitted explicit reference to 
gangs or the real purpose of the statute in the statutory 
language, in hopes of avoiding constitutional challenges to the 
statute. Legislative history at 2-3, 8-9. The legislative 
history demonstrates that the legislature was counting on the 
judiciary to apply the statute in a manner as to effectuate the 
true legislative intent. The legislators participating in the 
debate on the statute indicated their concern that the gang 
enhancement should only apply to true gang members, rather than 
to non-gang-related crimes involving multiple participants. The 
sponsor of the bill informed them that that concern was addressed 
in the section of the statute giving total discretion to judges 
on the applicability of the statute. Legislative history at 6. 
Because the gang enhancement statute does not meet the 
legislative purpose in a rational manner, but in fact relies on 
an unconstitutional judicial discretion provision to effectuate 
legislative intent, this Court should strike the statute. 
3. Impingement on rights of criminal defendants 
The gang enhancement statute purports to allow for the 
imposition of significant minimum terms of imprisonment for 
specific criminal conduct, while explicitly evading numerous 
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standard constitutional rights of criminal defendants, including 
the right to a preliminary hearing for a determination of 
probable cause, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 13; 
the right to a trial by jury, e.g. Constitution of Utah, Article 
I section 12/ and the right to a finding of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, e.g. United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. 
The legislature should not be allowed to create such extreme 
punitive consequences for criminal conduct, in circumvention of 
these fundamental rights. 
The fact that the legislature characterizes the statute as 
creating "enhancements," rather than as defining offenses, Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(5) (a), should not override 
fundamental constitutional rights of criminal defendants.1 
Section 76-3-203.1 purports to penalize stated criminal acts 
combined with specified mental states, and as such, the statute 
defines offenses. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-101 et seq. See 
also State v. Wedge, 652 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1982)(recognizing 
that "enhancement" statute actually defined elements of a crime, 
which should be assessed by a jury). Because the statute 
attempts to circumvent constitutional rights to preliminary 
hearings, jury trials, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, this 
Court should strike the statute. 
4. Vagueness - lack of warning to citizens 
Due process of law requires the legislature to enact laws 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court has already differed with 
legislature's characterization of the provision as an 
"enhancement." In State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994) , the 
court noted that the provision creates minimum mandatory sentences, 
rather than true enhancements. 
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which are sufficiently clear to inform citizens about how to 
conform their conduct to the law. E.g. United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV; Gravned v. Citv of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104 (1972). 
Mr. Rasmussen concedes that the average citizen likely has 
knowledge of the unlawful nature of the conduct encompassed in 
the offenses subject to enhancement and listed under subsection 
(4). However, the average citizen is unlikely to know whether 
the conduct at issue is subject to such extreme sentencing 
enhancement because the statute grants virtually unlimited 
discretion to the judge to determine whether the enhancement 
applies. See Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203.1(6) (allowing the 
judge to suspend the application of the gang enhancement as long 
as the judge finds that "the interests of justice would be best 
served" and states findings to this effect on the record). 
The broad applicability of the enhancement compounds the risk 
that the average citizen would have little forewarning as to the 
applicability of the enhancement. See Utah Code Ann. section 76-
3-203.1 (5) (b) (the statute applies regardless of whether the 
other person(s) acting in concert with the defendant "are not 
identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of 
those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or 
lesser offense.11). The Utah appellate courts interpret the 
statute as applying regardless of whether the parties share the 
same mens rea. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 461 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 905 n.9 (Utah App. 1994). This 
further promotes the possibility that someone could suffer the 
consequences of the gang enhancement statute without fair 
forewarning. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should strike Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-3-203.1. 
Respectfully submitted this *?& day of /?**.'/, 1995. 
JUDITH A. JENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this motion 
to Deputy District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this 2>0 day of QjQAjJi 1995. 
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